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Memorandum of law-Reyes v.
Superior Court of the State of
California
BY GERALD F. UELMEN, ESQ.
AND JANE WOLF ELDRIDGE, ESQ.

This memorandum probes the criminal attributes of a pregnant
woman's use of illicit drugs insofar as they may endanger the
fetus.
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1

3.

Is the failure to seek prenatal medical care conduct

2

which olaces a fetus in such situation that its person or health

3

is endangered?

4

All three of these issues are questions of first impression;

5

there are no other reported cases in the United States in which

6

a mother has been criminally charged with abuse of an unborn

7

fetus.

8

The California Conference of Methadone Programs entered this

9

case to assist the court as amicus curiae because of its concern

10

that the Court's ruling may affect efforts to encourage addicted

11

pregnant women to seek medical treatment, and may affect the

12

currently available treatment methods.

13

significance to all pregnant women, addicted or non-addicted,

14

as well as to all medical professionals who treat them, since the

15

duty of a pregnant woman to her unborn child is presently undefined

16

by the law.

17

The case is of great

The California Conference of Methadone Programs is comprised

18

of sixty-three drug abuse treatment programs in the State of

19

California which are authorized to distribute methadone to over

20

six thousand patients enrolled in these programs.

21

federal regulation. 21 C.F.R. S 310.505, each of these programs is

22

authorized, under carefully prescribed conditions, to administer

23

methadone to pregnant women.

Pursuant to

24
25
26

II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

There are two possible theories upon which a charge of

07

child endanqering against defendant Margaret Velasquez Reyes

28

might be based.

The first is the allegation of her ingestion of an
2
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1

addictive substance, heroin, with knowledge of its potential

2

harmful effects on her fetus.

3

failure to obtain prenatal medical treatment.

The second is the allegation of her

4

According to the court and attorneys for the prosecution and

5

defense, the prosecution against Margaret Reyes is based upon Phe

6

first theory:
The accusation here is the use of

7

THE COURT:

8

heroin after allegedly the mother was warned about

9

the nossible danaers in the using of it as far as

10

the unborn child was concerned.

11

MR. RIVAS:

12

Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing in this case.)*

13

THE COURT:

14

no notice of the Possible effects of what this drug

15

might do, I don't think that would be a violation of

16

the statute.

17

is for me to decide from all the evidence of this case

18

whether there was or was not notice and whether or not

19

the defendant administered herself heroin after that

20

time.

21

It is also arguable that the charge against Margaret

22

Ielasquez Reyes was based upon the second theory, her alleged

23

omission in failing to seek prenatal medical assistance; in the

24

direct examination of the orosecution's medical expert, Dr. V. G.

25

Muraligopal, the following testimony was elicited:

That's correct.

(Page 51 of the Reporter's

I don't think that if the mother had

But after notice; then that of course

(P.H. 53)

(Emphasis supplied.)

26
27
28

* Hereafter references to Reporter's Transcript of the
Preliminary Hearing in this case will be designated by P.H.
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Does the fact that the defendant did not have

1

Q:

2

prenatal care increase the risk to the children?

3

A:

Yes.

4

Q:

In--

6

I don't believe he finished

MR. RIVAS!

5

his answer.
THE WITNESS-

7

I'd like to qualify the

The reason being most of these

8

answer, if I can.

9

mothers who abuse heroin have been shown to have a

10

high incidence of infection, especially with venereal

11

disease and also infection with hepatitis because of

12

using drugs.

13

tension are known to be shown among drug abusing mothers.

14

Q-

15

which are created:

16

A:

17

In order to permit prosecution on the first theory, the

18

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must establish

19

probable cause that Margaret Velasquez Reyes was in the third

20

trimester of 1regnancy, and during that period ingested addicting

21

drugs in San Bernardino County with knowledge that this activity

22

would endanger the person or health of each of the two fetuses

23

she was carrying.

24

And also toxemia in pregnancy and hyper-

So prenatal care can alleviate some of the problems

Yes.

is that correct?

(P.H. 44)

Defendant Reyes had never verified the fact of her pregnancy

25

with a physician (P.H. 95), although she appeared pregnant to

26

others (P.H. 5),

27

delivered two children on October 31, 1976.

28

evidence that Ms. Reyes was aware at any time prior to delivery
4

felt herself to be pregnant (P.H. 6, 33-35),
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1

that she was carrying twins.

Pediatrician Muraligopal testified

2

that on October 31, he examined the children and observed the

3

first child to be a full-term product of a full-term pregnancy and,

4

the second, small and undergrown.

5

Within twenty-four hours, the physician observed that the children

6

were "jittery" (P.H. 41) and determined that the 9maller child was

7

experiencing hypocalcemia, a low level of serum calcium. (P.H. 42).

8

Despite the allegation of the orosecutor that no specific harm

9

need befall the child for the parent to be charged with child

Both appeared normal.

(P.R. 41)

10

endangering, testimony was elicited regarding the medical condition

31

of Ms. Reves' newborns%

12

nasal stuffiness, jitteriness, irritability, and crying (P.H. 58),

13

a "mild form of withdrawal" (P.R. 60-61).

14

treated for the effects of his withdrawal for about a month; the

15

second, weaker boy continued to receive medical treatment with the

16

drug thorazine through the date of Preliminary Hearing in

17

January, 1977.

18

large feedings at frequent intervals,

The first child was

(P.H. 88).

Several indications that the defendant took heroin during her

19

pregnancy were elicited at the Preliminary Hearing.

Deputy Sheriff

20

Jill Webster of the Child Abuse Unit of the Juvenile Division

21

stated that the defendant told her that she took heroin during her

22

pregnancy (P.H. 94)

23

her pregnancy M4s.Reyes ingested heroin, that is, whether or not it

24

took place during the months of September and/or October, 1976.

25

Nor did that statement reveal where the heroin ingestion took

26

place, that is, whether or not it took olace in San Bernardino

27

County or the State of California.

28

failed to show that Reyes' heroin ingestion took place after notic

That statement failed to reveal when during

Finally, fWebster's testimony
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1
2

of the possible adverse consequences for the child.
The second indication that Margaret Reyes took heroin during

3

her pregnancy came from pediatrician Muraligooal.

4

that he instructed Dr. Bangasser to confront the defendant regard-

5

ing opiate usage (P.H. 59), that he had no personal knowledge from

6

the defendant that she used heroin during her pregnancy (P.H. 60)

7

but that Ms. Reves had told Bangassar that she had used heroin

8

during her pregnancy (P.H. 42).

9

with information as to when or where such ingestion occurred, nor

He testified

Again, the court was not provided

10

whether it happened after notice of its potentially harmful effects

1.

on her unborn child.

12

The final indication of defendant's possible use of heroin was

13

offered by Public Health Nurse Cooke's testimony that she

14

observed needle marks on both of defendant's arms.

15

is unclear when these observations were made, although it would

16

appear to be in September, 1976.

17

the staleness or freshness of these marks.

18

Health Nurse, who had no professional experience with heroin-

19

addicted mothers (P.H. 30), no prior working experience with long-

20

term aadicts (P.H. 23),

21

(P.H. 22) and whose sole experience in detecting addicted

22

persons was some discussion in nursing courses (P.H. 17), offered

23

the opinion that Ms. Reyes was under the influence of heroin

24

during contacts with her. (P.H. 22, 23, 28).

(P.H. 11).

It

No testimony was elicited about
Finally, the Public

no previous contact with this defendant

25

The Court below correctly ruled that the prosecution could

26

not succeed without showing that the defendant was on notice of

27

the potential harm to the fetus prior to her ingestion of heroin.

28

The evidence of such notice offered at the preliminary hearing
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1 consisted of the testimony of Public Health Nurse Cooke that she
2

advised defendant that if she "was or has or is on heroin it

3

would affect the baby and that was a high risk" (P.H. 6) and that

4

it could be born addicted and suffering withdrawals and/or that

5

it could be stillborn. (P.H. 7).

t6

In addition, Deputy Sheriff Webster testified that, after the

7

babies were born, the defendant told her she knew what could happen

8

to the kids and that she nodded her head to knowing they could die

9

from withdrawal symptoms.

(P.H. 95).

10

It is implicit in the "notice" element that the State demon-

11

strate Margaret Velasquez Reyes knew of the pr6dictable risks and

12

thereafter decided to continue ingesting heroin.

13

factual showing that the defendant ingested heroin after she was

.14
15

There is no

advised of the potential hazards.
In order to permit prosecution on the second theory, the

16

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must establish

17

orobable cause that Margaret Velasquez Reyes, during the third

18

trimester of pregnancy, willfully refused to seek medical treatment,

19

knowing such refusal would endanger the person or health of each of

20

the two fetuses she was carrying.

21

Testimony was elicited through Ms. Cooke, the Public Health

22

Nurse, that the defendant knew she was pregnant, had been

23

pregnant previously, that she was Rh negative, had been advised

24

against future pregnancies by a physician, and had been a heroin

25

addict.

26

stressed the importance of Reyes' getting antepartum attention.

27

(P.H. 8).

28

medical aid. (P.H. 33).

(P.H. 6).

Ms. Cooke revealed that she had repeatedly

Defendant's sister had advised her repeatedly to go for
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Dr. Muraligopal testified that the absence of prenatal

1

(P.H.44 ).

There is

2

care increased the risk to the babies.

3

no requirement under the law that a pregnant woman seek or get

4

prenatal care.

5

no way she could compel a woman to obtain antepartum treatment.

6

(P.H. 15, 27).,

7

the defendant acknowledged she had not gone to a physician during

8

her term of pregnancy.

The Public Health Nurse testified that there is

further Deputy Sheriff Jill Webster testified

(P.H. 95).

The prosecution failed to produce evidence to establish

9
10

that the defendant did not receive any prenatal attention.

11

The only testimony addressing this issue indicated that the

12

defendant did not receive prenatal attention from a physician.

13

However, on at least one occasion, it was shown Ms. Reyes sought

14

medical advice from Public Health Nurse Cooke, and visited the

15

clinic for treatment.

16

as to the availability of methadone maintenance treatment in

17

the locale.

18

cal treatment could be procured that would not necessitate her

19

experiencing withdrawal.

(P.H. 10-11).

No evidence was offered

Apparently, defendant was never advised that medi7

Apart from an ambiguous reference by Public Health Nurse

20
21

Cooke that "it was a case for confidentiality" (P.H. 8),

22

does not appear that Ms. Reyes was ever advised concerning the

23

risks of admitting her use of heroin in seeking medical treat-

24

ment.

25

held in confidence.

26
27
28

it

Certainly, none of her statements to Nurse Cooke was

/1
//
/I
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IT IS ACCEPTED MEDICAL PRACTICE TO TREAT ADDICTED
MOTHERS WITH METHADONE, ALTHOUGH WITHDRAWAL OF
THE INFANT FROM METHADONE MAY OCCUR AFTER BIRTH.

III.

2

Although Respondent urges the Court to ignore reference

3
4

to articles not offered in evidence at the Preliminary Hearing

5

(Return to Alternative Writ of Mandate, p. 18),

6

summary is offered in conformity with the advice offered to

7

appellate judges by Bernard E. Witkin:

the following

"Where policy is a determinative factor, and

8

scientific

. . . background is necessary for an un-

11

derstanding of the issues, courts freely seek aid
from encyclopedias, works on science, economics, or
sociology, and sometimes newspaper or magazine reports of current events." Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Ooinions, 572, p. 119 (1977).

12

Moreover, it will be seen that the testimony of the

9
10

13

attending physician elicited at the preliminary hearing in

14

this case is consistent with the medical literature.

15

lengthy and repetitious citations, references will be made by

16

number to the medical literature listed in the Index to this

17

brief.

18

To avoid

While this is the first reported case in the United

19

States in which a mother giving birth to an addicted infant

20

has been charged with criminal child abuse, such births are

21

not a rare phenomenon.

22

at Philadelphia General Hospital was born to a drug-dependent

23

mother.

24

Practice in East Harlem, one in every 29 births was reported

25

for 1974.

26

experience in treating as many as 40 addicted infants.

In 1972, one in every 16 infants born

(1) At the New York Center for Comprehensive Health

(2) The attending physician in this case reported
(P.H. 4(b).

27

While the effects of a mother's drug ingestion upon the

28

fetus has been the subject of substantial medical research in
9
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l

recent years, many questions remain unanswered.

2

marizing this research, however, a word of caution is appro-

Before sum-

3

priate.

4

accompanying the birth of addicted infants are attributable to

5

the mother's low standard of health care, rather than simply

6

the ingestion of drugs.

7

nant women never see a physician during their pregnancies.

8

Where a program of comprehensive health care is provided,

9

dramatic improvements in neonatal health have been reported.

Many of the obstetrical and medical complications

Seventy-five percent of addicted preg(1)

10

The incidence of low birthweight was reduced from 48% to 24%,

11

severe withdrawal in the infant was reduced from 41% to 6%, and

12

the frequency of other neonatal problems declined from 41% to

13

24% in one well documented study of the effect of comprehensive

14

clare of the pregnant addict.

15

using heroin received all the prenatal care and special services

16

offered to the women in methadone maintenance programs, they

17

would have larger, healthier babies. (4)

18

(3)

It

appears that if

women

Methadone is a synthetic opiate utilized to prevent with-

19

drawal and euphoria in those addicted to opiates.

20

gally administered to 72,000 ex-heroin addicts in the United

21

States at more than 400 Centers. (13) Twenty-five percent of

22

these patients are estimated to be women of child bearing age.

23

(8) The goal of methadone maintenance treatment is summarized

24

in the federal Methadone Treatment Manual as "the complete

25

physical, psychological, social and economic rehabilitation of

26

each patient in the program."

27

pensed on a daily basis at a clinic staffed by a physician,

28

nurses, social workers and other supporting personnel.

(13)

It is le-

Methadone is normally dis-
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Virtually all drugs ingested by a pregnant woman may

1

The number of

2

have some effect on the fetus she is carrying.

3

drugs taken by pregnant women has increased so dramatically

4

in recent years that "the fetus is potentially at greater risk

5

from well-intentioned medicaments than from the vicissitudes of

6

pregnancy and delivery."

7

other narcotic drugs have low molecular weight, they cross the

8

placental barrier and appear in the fetal blood and tissues

9

within an hour, regardless of how they are ingested. (1) As a

(5) Because heroin, methadone and

10

result of repeated ingestion, the fetus becomes addicted in

11

utero, and if the mother experiences withdrawal from a narcotic

12

drug, the fetus will experience withdrawal in utero.

13

drawal of the mother is not recommended during the third tri-

14

mester, because fetal distress may result in premature delivery,

15

(6) or even fetal demise. (P.H. 45).

16

mother is not even aware of her pregnancy until late in the

17

second trimester, since heroin and methadone both interfere

18

with regular ovulation and menstruation. (4) Thus, the treat-

19

ment of choice recommended by most physicians, including the

20

attending physician in this case (P.H. 81), and endorsed by

21

the American Medical Association (7) is low-dose methadone

22

maintenance of the mother.

23

to mothers maintained on methadone will also be dependent on

24

methadone and undergo withdrawal after birth.

25

of methadone during pregnancy, therefore, is not to prevent

26

withdrawal in the infant, but to decrease the incidence of

27

other complications occuring during illicit heroin use. (8)

28

With-

Frequently, the addicted

It is expected that infants born

/1
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.

Methadone maintenance for pregnant addicts has also re-

2

ceived the cautious approval of the federal agencies charged

3

with supervision of methadone programs.

4

by the Food.and Drug Administration of the Department of Health,

5

Education and Welfare recommend dosage levels be maintained as

6

low as possible, and require the female patient be "fully in-

7

formed concerning the possible risks to a pregnant woman or

8

her unborn child from the use of methadone." 21 C.F.R. 130.44

9

(6) (c)(2); 37 Fed. Reg. No. 242, p. 26798 (December 15, 1972).

Regulations adopted

10

In compliance with this regulation, the government consent form

12

signed by all female patients of child bearing age contains the

12

following warning:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

"Besides the possible risks involved with the
lona-term use of methadone, I further understand
that, like heroin and other narcotic drugs, information on its effects on pregnant women and on their
unborn children is at present inadequate to guarantee
that it may not produce significant or serious side
effects.
It has been explained to me and I understand
that methadone is transmitted to the unborn child
and will cause physical dependence. Thus, if I am
pregnant and suddenly stop taking methadone, I or
the unborn child may show signs of withdrawal which
may adversely affect my pregnancy or the child. I
shall use no other drugs without the Medical Director
or his assistants' approval, since these drugs, particularly as they might interact with methadone, may
harm me or my unborn child. I shall inform any
other doctor who sees me during my present or any
future pregnancy or who sees the child after birth,
of my current or past participation in a methadone
treatment program in order that he may properly care
for my child and me.
It has been explained to me that after the birth
of my child I should not nurse the baby because
methadone is transmitted through the milk to the
baby and this may cause physical dependence on methadone in the child. I understand that for a brief
period following birth, the child may show temporary
irritability or other ill effects due to my use of
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methadone. It is essential for the child's physician to know of my participation in a methadone
treatment program so that he may provide appropriate
medical treatment for the child.

3
4
5
6
7
8

All the above possible effects of methadone
have been fully explained to me and I understand
that at present, there have not been enough studies
conducted on the long term use of the drug to assure
complete safety to my child. With full knowledge of
this, I consent to its use and promise to inform the
Medical Director or one of his assistants immediately
if I become pregnant in the future."
Form FD 2635
(12/72), Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration.

9
10

The infant withdrawal syndrome may vary significantly,

11

depending upon the duration and type of maternal addiction and

12

the mother's drug level just prior to giving birth.

13

one-third of infants born to drug dependent mothers show no

14

symptoms of withdrawal.

15

reported observing no infant withdrawal even where mothers

16

took heroin up to two hours prior to delivery.

17

One observer reports severe withdrawal may occur in the infant

18

whose mother has taken large amounts of drugs for a long time,

Nearly

The attending physician in this case

(P.H. 63, 71).

19

(1) while other observers find no correlation between maternal

20

dose and presence of withdrawal, claiming infants whose mothers

21

were maintained on 200 mg of methadone per day experienced

22

withdrawal while some of those whose mothers were maintained

23

on higher doses remained symptom free.

24

(8)

As between heroin and methadone, conflicting reports have

25

been published, two claiming withdrawal is less severe in in-

26

fants addicted to methadone, (9, 10) while one study reported

27

a higher incidence and more prolonged duration of withdrawal

28

symptoms among methadone addicted infants than among those
13
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1

addicted to heroin (11).

2

reported the effects of withdrawal from heroin and methadone

3

were "similar."

(P.H. 49-50)

Most addicted infants, whether born to heroin or metha-

4
5

done mothers, appear physically and behaviorally normal at

6

birth.

7

lessness, hyperactive reflexes and regurgitation, appear

8

between 4 and 24 hours of age if the mother has been on heroin

9

alone.

Clinical signs of withdrawal, such as tremors, rest-

These symptoms may not appear until the end of the

10

first day, or as much as a week after birth, where the mother

11

has been on methadone alone.

12

ation of symptoms is anywhere from 6 days to 8 weeks.

Depending on severity, the

4ur-

(1)

Treatment of withdrawal symptoms in newborn infants

13

(4) Phenobarbital is

141

includes swaddling and careful feeding.

151

especially effective in controlling irritability (1) and in

16

one recent study of 118 addicted infants, satisfactory effects

171,

were obtained with phenobarbital in all but four children.

18

those four, paregoric was administered with subsequent relief.

19

(1)

20

of withdrawal symptoms, from 5 days to 2 months.

21

In

Duration of this medication varies, according to severity
(1)

After treatment of withdrawal symptoms, the prognosis

22

for normal growth and development of the infant is excellent.

23

of 31 infants born to patients in one New York methadone pro-

24

gram, all have done well following discharge from the hospital,

25

with no abnormalities in growth noted.

26

have been reported elsewhere.

27i

this case reported observing no cases of fetal death, infant

28

mortality, or brain damage resulting solely from a mother's

(12)

(8)

Similar results

The attending physician in

14
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1

heroin usage.

(P.H. 68-69,

79).

2
3
4
5

IV.

PENAL CODE S273a DOES NOT PERMIT PROSECUTION
OF A MOTHER FOR ABUSE OF CHILDREN PRIOR TO
BIRTH.

The purpose of Penal Code S273a was to protect children

6

after their birth.

7

is read in pari materia with Penal Code Sections 270 and 275.

8

The scope of the requirement that statutes in pari materia be

9

construed together was neatly summarized in Old Homestead

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

This purpose clearly emerges when 5273a

Bakery v. Marsh, 75 Cal. App. 247, 258, 242 P. 749 (1925):
"Statutes in pari materia are those which
relate to the same person
-or
thing, or to the same
class of persons or things. In the construction
or a particular statute, or in the interpretation
of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the
same subject, or having the same general purpose,
should be read in connection with it, as together
constituting one law. The endeavor should be made,
by tracing the history of legislation on the subject, to ascertain the uniform and consistenttheu r pose of the legislature, or to discover how
policy of the legislature with reference to the
subject matter has been changed or modified from
time to time. With this purpose in view therefore
it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at
the same session of the legislature, but also acts
passed at prior and subsequent sessions, and even
those which have been repealed."
Accord, Isobe v.
Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 584, 590,
116 Cal. Rptr. 376, 526 P.2d 528 (1974).
Penal Code §273a, as first enacted in 1905 provided:
"Any person who willfully causes or permits
any child to suffer, or who inflicts thereon un-justifiable physical pain or mental suffering, and
whoever, having the care or custody of any child,
causes or permits the life or limb of such child
to be endangered, or the health of such child to
be injured, and any person who willfully causes or
permits such child to be placed in such situation
that its life or limb may be endangered, or its
health likely to be injured, is guildy of a misdemeanor." Stats., 1905, C.568, p. 759, §5.

28.1
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1

Prior to the 1905 enactment of S273a, the only statu-

2

tory protection of children contained in the Penal Code was

3

§270, enacted in 1872 to provide as follows-

4
5
6

"Every parent of any child who willfully omits,
without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed
upon him by law, to furnish necessary food, clothing,
shelter, or medical attention for such child is
guilty of a misdemeanor."

7

Significantly, the same 1905 act which added 5273a to the

8

Penal Code amended §270, and the act was entitled "An act to

9

amend section[s] two hundred and seventy . . . and to add new

10

sections thereto to be numbered

11

three a . . . , all relatina to crimes against children."

12

(Emphasis added).

13

"child" to have the same meaning in both sections 270 and 273a.

14

Stats., 1905, C.568, p. 758, 91.

15

..

..

two hundred and seventy

Thus, it is clear the legislature intended

In 1925, the legislature amended Penal Code §270, adding

16

the provision that "A child conceived but not yet born is to

17

be deemed an existing person insofar as this section is con-

18

cerned."

19

amendment to uphold the conviction of a defendant for failure

20

to support an unborn child, the Court in People v. Yates, 114

21

Cal. App. Supp. 782, 785, 298 P. 961 (1931) noted, "Until the

22

addition was made, the section had no application to an un-

23

born child."

24

P.2d 4S7

25

ly extend its application to unborn children is strongly in-

26

dicative of legislative intent to exclude unborn children from

27

its operation.

28

closely related context,

Stats.,

1925, C.325, p. 544, S1.

In construing this

Accord, People v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25

(1933).

Thus, the failure to amend 5273a to similar-

As recently noted by the Supreme Court in a
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"[W]hen the Legislature determines to confer
legal personality on unborn fetuses for certain
limited purpose, it expresses that intent in spe-

1
2

cific and appropriate terms;

3
4
5
6
7

Still further support can be found by comparing Penal

8
9

. . . [Wie may fairly

infer that if at any time during the ensuing century the Legislature had meant to include fetuses
it could
.
among the class of victims described .
easily have so provided by amending the statute in
either of the ways in which, as we have seen, it
amended Penal Code sections 187 and 270 for the
very same purpose. We decline to promulgate such
an amendment ourselves." Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d 564, 579, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).

Code §273a with the abortion prohibition contained in Penal
In 1963, 5273a was amended to increase the penalty

10

Code §275.

11

to up to ten years in the state prison for abuse of a child

12

"under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great

13

bodily harm or death."

14

the same time, §275 provided a penalty of upto five years in

15

the state prison for a woman who submits to an unlawful abor-

16

tion.

17

spondent, it would mean the legislature intended the killing

18

of a fetus by the mother to be a less serious crime than en-

19

dangering its health.

20

by recent changes in the law.

21

Code §187, defining murder to include the unlawful killing of

22

a fetus, specifically exempts a killing which was consented to

23

by the mother.

24

form Determinate Sentencing Act provides a maximum penalty of

25

3 years for both Sections 273a and 275.

26

§5165, 168.

27

no greater penalty for unlawfully aborting her pregnancy in

28

the third trimester than she faces by giving birth to a child

Stats., 1963, C.783, p. 1811, Sl.

At

If g273a is given the, interpretation urged by the re-

Nor is this anomalous result affected
The 1970 amendment to Penal

Stats., 1970, C.1311, p. 2440, §l.

Stats.,

The Uni-

1976, C.1139,

Thus, even today, an addicted mother would face

17
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If the legislature

1

who subsequently experiences withdrawal.

2

had intended 5273a to provide protection for health of the

3

unborn, it would surely have provided a lesser penalty than

4

provided for killing the unborn!

5

The Respondent's suggestion that delaying prosecution

6

until the child is born somehow distinguishes this case from

7

a prosecution for abuse of a fetus misses the point.

8

statute prohibits causing or permitting a child to be placed

9

in such a situation that its (the child's) person or health is

The

The only reason the children in this case exper-

10

endangered.

11

ienced withdrawal is because they were addicted as fetuses.

12

Thus, at the

13

dangered their health, they were not "children" within the

14

meaning of the statute.

time they were

"placed" in a situation that en-

15
16

V.

IF PENAL CODE 1273a WERE EXPANDED TO REQUIRE
PRENATAL CARE FOR A FETUS, THE STATUTE WOULD

BE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.

171
is

Although this issue has been briefed by the Petitioner

19

and the Respondent, the full implications of expanding the

20

scope of Penal Code §273a to include prenatal care of fetuses

21

requires further explication in light of recent medical re-

22

search.

23

Adoption of the interpretation of 5273a urged by the

24

Respondent would render the causing or permitting a fetus to

25

be placed in such situation that its person or health is

26

"likely to be injured" a crime.

27

cently revealed the extent to which the health of a fetus may

28

be adversely affected by the habits of its mother.

Medical science has only re-
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just a few examples:
A.

Alcohol.

The "fetal alcohol syndrome" has been

identified as the third most common birth defect in

3
4

the United States.

5

pregnancy has been linked to stunted growth of the

6

fetus, cardiac anomalies, and mental retardation

7

(I.Q. 79 or below).

8

about one-half of the infants born to severely alco-

9

holic mothers.

The ingestion of alcohol during

These features are found in

Corrigan, "The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome,"

10

72 Texas Medicine 72 (January, 1976).

il

led the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Al-

12

coholism to issue a "Health Warning" advising preg-

13

nant women that more than two drinks per day increases

14

the risk of giving birth to a deformed or mentally

15

retarded baby.

16

women fall into the high risk "heavry drinker" cate-

17

gory.

1s

No. 6, p. 1 (July, 1977).

19

B.

These findings

NIAAA estimated that about 5% of all

1 U.S. Journal of Drug and Alcohol Dependence,

Smoking.

The evidence is overwhelming that the new-

20

born infants of mothers who smoke cigarettes during

21

pregnancy are smaller and more liable to die than

22

those of comparable mothers who do not smoke.

23

parently, this phenomenon is related to the high

24

level of carbon monoxide in the blood of smoking

25

mothers, which readily traverses the placenta.

26

Hyffen, "Smoking in Pregnancy," 15 Develop. Med.

27

Child Neurol. 355

28

pregnant women smoke.

(1973).

Ap-

Approximately 50% of all

Schenkel & Vorherr, "Non-
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1

Prescription Drugs During Pregnancy:

2

Teratogenic and Toxic Effects Upon Embryo and Fetus,"

3

12 Journal of Reproductive Medicine 27 (January, 1974).

4

C.

Non-Prescription Drugs.

Potential

It has been reported that

5

non-prescription drugs available over the counter

6

may cause extensive damage in the unborn baby.

7

pirin has been linked to damage to the nervous system,

8

kidneys, liver, and bleeding tendency; antihistamines,

9

barbiturates and cold and cough medicines may cause

AS-

10

skeletal malformations, liver and brain damage; and

fl

antacid and laxative use are related to kidney and

12

brain damage.

13

women use aspirin and antacids, and 60% take three

14

or more drugs simultaneously.

15

supra.

16

It is estimated that 65% of pregnant

Schenkel & Vorherr,

These examples are only the tip of the iceberg which

17

would be created by the interpretation of §273a urged by the

18

respondent.

19

upon smoking or drinking be subject to criminal prosecution,

20

but the prospective mother who disregards her doctor's in-

21

structions to drink more milk would also come within the terms

22

of the statute.

23

317

24

citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391,

25

46 S. Ct. 126 (1926): "[A]

26

quires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of com-

27

mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning apd

28

differ as to its application violates the first essential of

Not only would the pregnant mother who insists

In People v McCaughen, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414,

P.2d 974 (1957), Justice Traynor spoke for the Cogrt,

statute which either forbids or re-

20
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1

due process of law."

2

common intelligence will be left to guess at the meaning of

3

the law.

4

rely upon the good sense of prosecutors to invoke the statute

5

in only aggravated circumstances.

6

furter in his concurring opinion in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340

7

U.S. 270,

8
9
10

It is equally offensive that women of

Nor is it any answer to this argument that we can

As noted by Justice Frank-

285 (1951):

"The.vice to be guarded against is arbitrary
action by'officials. The fact that in a particular
instance an action appears not arbitrary does not
save the validity of the authority under which the
action was taken."

11

More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the evil of

12

vague laws in the following terms:

13

16

"A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."
Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 109 (1971). See also Smith v. Goquen,
415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974).

17

If the law is to impose a standard of prenatal care to

14
15

1s

be enforced by criminal sanctions against pregnant mothers,

19

such a step should be accompanied by carefully circumscribed

20

definitions, rather than the vague concept that the health of

21

the fetus is "likely to be injured," leaving prosecutors free

22

to apply this prohibition on an ad hoc and subjective basis.

23

The task of formulating such definitions is more appropriately

24

left to the legislature, which can invite expert commentary

25

from those most likely to be affected by such legislation.

26

Even as presently interpreted Section 273a approaches

27

the outer limits of permissible vagueness and overbreadth.

23

While upholding the statute, the Court in People v. Beaugez,
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1

232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 656-658 (1965) noted:

2

"The type of conduct which this portion of the
statute seeks to reach defies precise definition.
In number and kind the situations where a child's

3

life or health may be imperiled are infinite. Yet
the aim of the statute is not obscure and its objective is a salutary social one. It seeks to protect children from willful mistreatment whether

4
5

directly or indirectly applied . . . by applying the

6

'rule of reason' to the whole provision, we construe
its meaning as a whole to condemn the intentional
placing of a child, or permitting him to be placed,
in a situation in which serious physical danger or
health hazard to the child is reasonably foreseeable.
This is the construction of intent which the context
of the statute as a whole justifies, and so constructed we find it not void for vagueness."

7
8
9
10

The "rule of reason" approach adopted in Beaugez would
11
offer little assistance if the statute were interpreted to
12
include a fetus.

The danger to a fetus may be subject to a

13
wide spectrum both in the degree of harm which may result and
14
the degree of risk that the particular activity will produce

15
the harm.

For example, if six drinks a day creates a 40%

16
probability that a child will be born retarded, while four
17
drinks a day reduces the probability to 20%, and the mother
18
is fully aware of these risks, how do we apply a "rule of
19
reason" to say one mother is a child abuser and the other is
20
not?

What if it is shown three drinks a day may reduce the

21
child's I.Q. 10% while six drinks a day reduces it 30%?
22
23
VI.
24

IF PENAL CODE §273a WERE EXPANDED TO FORBID
THE INGESTION OF ADDICTING DRUGS DURING PREGNANCY, THE STATUTE WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

25

If the Court adopts the interpretation of Penal Code
26
9273a urged by the respondent, to forbid the ingestion of
27
addicting drugs during pregnancy as conduct which endangers
28
22
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1

the health of a child, a whole host of constitutional diffi-

2

culties looms on the horizon.

3

rational classifications, recuire compulsory self-incrimina-

4

tion, impose cruel and unusual punishment, and be pre-empted

5

by federal law.

6

intended to enact a valid statute.

7

provision, the Court must "adopt an interpretation that, con-

8

sistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates

9

doubts as to the provision's constitutionality."

The statute would create ir-

The Court must presume that the Legislature
Thus, in applying the

In 2e Kay,

10

1 Cal. 3d 930, 942, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970); People v. Amor,

1

12 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 114 Cal. Rptr. 765

(1974).

12

A. If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to forbid the

13

ingestion of heroin during pregnancy, while per-

14

mitting the ingestion of other harmful substances,

15

the statute would create irrational classifications

16

violating the guarantee of equal protection of the

171

law.

18

Apart from the withdrawal syndrome, no other risk to

19

infant health was shown by the evidence presented at the

20

preliminary hearing, nor is it likely that any other risk

21

could be shown.

22

risk of the infant going through withdrawal is equally great

23

when the mother is maintained on methadone, which is the course

24

of treatment generally recommended by medical experts.

25

risking withdrawal is placing a fetus "in such situation that

26

its person or health is endangered," there would seem to be no

27

rational basis to distinguish heroin from other addictive drugs.

28i

While the mother addicted to heroin can be distinguished from

The reason this is significant is that the

23
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If

1

the mother being treated with methadone by the absence of

2

medical supervision, this is a factor which transcends the

3

ingestion of addicting substances.

4

medical care always creates greater risks for the unborn

5

child, whether the mother is addicted or not.

6

absence of prenatal medical care which is seen as the act

7

which endangers the health of the fetus, there is no rational

8

basis to distinguish the addict mother from the diabetic

9

mother in terms of the risk to their unborn children.

10

The absence of prenatal

If it is the

The infant withdrawal syndrome is not unique to narcotic

12

drugs. Barbiturates, whether prescribed as medication or not,

12

also have addictive potential, cross the placenta, and addict

13

the fetus.

14

heroin withdrawal have been observed in newborn infants born

15

to mothers who ingested barbiturates during their pregnancy.

16

Desmond, Schwanecke, Wilson, Yasunaga & Burgdorff, "Maternal

17
181
191

Withdrawal symptoms similar in every respect to

Barbiturate Utilization and Neonatal Withdrawal Symptomatology,
80 Journal of Pediatrics 190

(February, 1972).

When one compares the short-term effects of heroin with-

20

drawal to the permanent birth defects related to the excessive

21

use of alcohol, one is hard put to even come up with a rational

22

basis to distinguish heroin from alcohol in terms of the risks

23

to fetal health presented by their ingestion during pregnancy.

24

The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the

25

laws has been judicially defined to mean "that no person or

26

class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the

27

laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in

28

like circumstances in their lives, liberty and property and in
24
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1

their pursuit of happiness."

2

3d 1, 21, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971).

3

classification impinges upon a fundamental right, the burden

4

is upon the state to show a compelling interest to justify

5

the classification.

6

privacy are fundamental rights that call for especially close

7

scrutiny of the state interest which justifies their abridg-

8

ment.

9

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705 (1973); Griswold v.

Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App.
Where a legislative

The right to procreate and the right to

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942);

10

Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).

An interpre-

11

tation of S273a to prohibit the ingestion of heroin by a preg-

12

nant mother, while allowing the ingestion 'of other substances

13

such as methadone and barbiturates, which also have a potential

14

for infant withdrawal, could not withstand the "particular

15

careful scrutiny" that the equal protection clause demands.

16

Nor could any prohibition of any addicting drug be justified

17

if the ingestion of alcohol were exempted, since alcohol creates

18

greater risks of permanent injury to the fetus.

19

Thus, the vagueness limitation of due process, and the

20

rational classification requirement of the equal protection clausE

21

emerge as a double edged sword to pierce the construction of

22

5273a urged by the respondent:

23

substances during pregnancy is proscribed, the prohibition

24

would be vague and overbroad; if the prohibition is limited to

25

heroin, or even to addicting drugs, the statute runs afoul of

26

the equal protection clause.

27

thicket is legislation which is carefully drafted to distin-

28

guish the risks presented by various categories of behavior,

if ingestion of all harmful

The obvious route out of this
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1

with the severity of sanctions imposed being varied accord-

2

ingly.

3

B.

If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to forbid the

4

ingestion of addicting drugs during pregnancy, the

5

companion provision of Penal Code §llll.5 would

6

require compulsory self-incrimination.

7

If the ingestion of addicting drugs during pregnancy is

8

held to place a child in such situation that its person or

9

health is endangered, then every addicted mother who seeks

10

medical help may come within the provisions of Penal Code

11

11161.5, which require physicians, nurses, social workers and

12

others to report "any injury prohibited by the terms of Section

13

273a" to the local police authority and the juvenilelprobation

14

department, or to the county welfare or health department.

15

a practical matter, this could discourage addicted mothers

16

from seeking medical help, which is the worst thing the law

17

could do.

16

addicted mother to incriminate herself, in violation of the

19

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-

20

tion and Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution.

21

As

As a constitutional matter, this would compel the-

While the reporting requirement of §11161.5 does not

22

ordinarily compel self-incrimination, since the doctor, nurse

23

or social worker is simply reporting what he or she observed

24

based upon contact with the child who was a victim of abuse,

25

if §273a is extended to include a fetus, the information being

26

reported will come directly from examination of and discussion

27

with the mother.

28

will subject herself to substantial hazards of self-incrimination,

By providing this information, the mother

26
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1

since there is a real risk of prosecution as a child abuser.

2

Where disclosures are extracted from a "highly selective group

3

inherently suspect of criminal activities," and the risk of

4

criminal prosecution is a real one, reporting procedures have

5

been held to violate the privilege against self-incrimination.

6

Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70, 78-79, 86 S. Ct. 194 (1965);

7

Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48, 57, 88 S. Ct. 697

8

(1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96-99, 88 S. Ct.

9

722 (1968).

10
11

Narcotics addicts are certainly "inherently sus-

pect of criminal activities."
In Blinder v. Division of Narcotic Enforcement, 25 Cal.

12

App. 3d 174, 101 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1972), the Court upheld the

13

requirement of Health & Safety Code 511395 (now 511221) that a

14

physician report the prescribing of a narcotic to an addict

15

to the Attorney General.

16

argument of the addict plaintiffs, the Court said:

17
1
19
20

In rejecting the self-incrimination

"The sections of the statutory scheme attacked
do not impose any direct reporting requirement upon
addict plaintiffs. However, it is evident that the
addict must inform the physician of his addiction
and that the physician's subsequent report will
identify the patient as an addict. However, narcotic addiction is not a crime and no one may be
punished simply because he is a narcotic addict

21

. . . Any risk of prosecution is necessarily a

22

'remote possibility out of the ordinary course of
law.'"
25 Cal. App. 3d 188.

23

The Blinder reasoning is readily distinguishable from

24

this case.

25

not her exposure as an addict, but her exposure as a "child

26

abuser."

27

torial discretion is exercised, the "risk of prosecution" if

28

the addict mother is reported as a "child abuser" is certainly

Here, the risk of incrimination to the mother is

If this case serves as an example of how prosecu-

27
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1

more than a "remote possibility."
C.

2

If Penal Code 5273a is interpreted to forbid

3

the ingestion of addicting drugs during preg-

4

nancy, the statute will violate the constitu-

5

tional prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-

6

ment.
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S. Ct.

7
8

1417

(1962), the United States Supreme Court held:
"That a state law which imprisons a person thus
affected as a criminal, even though he has never
touched any narcotic drug within the State or been
guilty of any irregular behavior there inflicts a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."

9
10
11
12

The Respondent's attempt to dismiss the applicability of

13

this precedent is too simplistic.

It is suggested that Robin-

14
son is inapplicable because the offensive conduct involved here
15
is the use of narcotics, rather than the status of being an
16
addict.

The speciousness of this distinction is immediately

17

18

apparent when we explore the options available to a female
Essentially, she has

19

addict.who discovers she is pregnant.

20

two choices, assuming she has decided against abortion:
continue to use, or go through withdrawal.

Both of these

21

22
23

choices present risks to the fetus.

If she continues to use,

her baby will be born addicted and experience withdrawal after
birth.

If she goes through withdrawal, the fetus will exper-

24
ience withdrawal in utero, and the fetal distress may precipi25
tate a premature delivery with all of the concomitant risks
26
that represents.

Thus, it is clear that it is the mother's

27
28

status as an addict that creates the danger to the health of
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1

the fetus, and she may face the risk of punishment whether

2

she continues to use or not.

3

D.

If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to forbid the

4

ingestion of all addicting drugs during pregnancy,

5

the statute will be pre-empted by federal laws.

6

Federal regulations currently permit the use of metha-

7

done maintenance to treat addicted females even though they

8

are pregnant.

9

p. 26798 (December 15, 1972).

21 C.F.R. 130.44(6) (c), 37 Fed. Reg. No. 242,
In addition, federal law (42

10

U.S.C.A. §242a(a))

11

the disclosure of the identity of any patient in a methadone

12

treatment program.

13

forbid the ingestion by pregnant women of all drugs which

14

produce withdrawal effects in infants, such an interpretation

15

would include methadone, and if Penal Code §11161.5 is inter-

16

preted to require that addicted mothers be reported, both

17

statutes would collide with federal law.

18

federal law would render these Penal Code provisions invalid

19

under the doctrine of pre-emption.

20

and regulations (42 C.F.R. 52.1) prohibit

If Penal Code §273a is interpreted to

The supremacy of

As recently applied in Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,

21

411 U.S. 624, 633, 93 S. Ct. 1854

22

nature of the scheme of federal regulation" can lead to the

23

conclusion that there is pre-emption.

24

the pervasive nature of federal regulation of methadone treat-

25

ment has resulted in such pre-emption.

26

with respect to the federal confidentiality regulations, it is

27

specifically provided that "No state law, however, may either

28

authorize or compel any disclosure prohibited by this part."

(1973), the "pervasive

It is submitted that

Moreover, at least

29
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1

42 C.F.R. S2.23. Cf. People v. Newman, 32 N.Y. 2d 379, 345

2

H.Y.S.

2d 502

(1973).

3
4
5

VII.

CONCLUSION

This case presents a tragic example of the plight

6

facing the pregnant addict and her children today.

The goal

7

of encouraging the pregnant addict to seek medical treatment

8

for herself and her child is a laudable one.

9

be stymied by a holding that the ingestion of addicting drugs

That goal will

10

during pregnancy or failure to seek prenatal medical care is

11

criminal child abuse.

12
13

Respectfully submitted,

14

LOYOLA LAW CLINICS

15
16
17
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JANE WOLF ELDRIDGE
Attorney-at-Law

18
19
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